Codes, convergence, and where real boards go beyond the rulebook

Corporate governance has evolved from a niche academic topic to a mainstream discipline that shapes how companies create value, manage risk, and earn investor trust. Behind every governance framework lie three practical questions: which philosophy of governance truly works, how national codes differ in practice, and whether companies today are merely complying with rules or actively using governance as a competitive advantage.

A quick survey of major governance codes shows both diversity and convergence. The UK Corporate Governance Code remains one of the clearest examples of a principle-based regime, using “comply or explain” to encourage thoughtful disclosure, strong board effectiveness, structured evaluations, and transparent remuneration practices. Germany’s Corporate Governance Code reflects its distinctive two-tier board structure, combining legally binding rules with recommendations and suggestions that emphasise supervisory oversight and codify the interaction between management, shareholders, and labour. Japan’s Corporate Governance Code focuses on improving board independence, board effectiveness, and investor dialogue, addressing historical challenges of insider-driven boards and cross-shareholding. Singapore’s Code blends principles and explicit provisions, with particular attention to technology risk and market integrity in its role as a global financial hub. Overarching all of these, the G20/OECD Principles continue to serve as the global reference point, defining the essential elements of transparency, accountability, equitable treatment of shareholders, and consideration for stakeholders.

These codes reveal much about the societies in which they are embedded. Differences reflect institutional architecture, such as whether countries use unitary or two-tier boards, as well as market structures, from bank-dominated systems to highly dispersed shareholder bases. Yet a common core runs through all of them: independent oversight, transparent reporting, robust risk management and internal controls, and an emphasis on board effectiveness. This shared foundation is the clearest sign of global governance convergence.

The debate between principles-based governance and prescriptive, rules-based governance remains central. Rules offer certainty, reduce ambiguity, and make enforcement easier. This is the logic behind the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which articulates clear and mandatory requirements for internal controls, auditor attestation, audit committee independence, and financial expertise. Principles, on the other hand, allow companies to tailor governance to their strategies and contexts. They focus on outcomes rather than processes and rely on transparent disclosure and active market discipline. The UK and OECD approaches exemplify this model, encouraging boards to explain how they apply principles to create long-term value.

In practice, the world is moving toward a hybrid. Regulators increasingly codify a small number of non-negotiable rules, particularly around financial reporting, internal controls, and audit committee structure, while leaving broader aspects of board effectiveness, stakeholder engagement, sustainability oversight, and strategy formulation to principles. Investor stewardship bodies such as Federated Hermes amplify this hybrid by imposing expectations through voting policies and engagement, creating an informal enforcement layer that often exceeds regulatory requirements. For these reasons, it is unlikely that the world will converge on a single governance philosophy. Instead, we are witnessing convergence on a core set of enforceable rules, wrapped in a broader ecosystem of principles that allow national and cultural adaptation.

A review of governance disclosures from major global companies demonstrates that many organisations now go significantly beyond the minimum legal requirements. HSBC, Siemens, Toyota, DBS, and Apple all present governance not as compliance text but as part of their strategic narrative. Toyota and DBS explicitly link governance to long-term strategy, sustainability commitments, and technology oversight. DBS’s emphasis on cyber and technology risk oversight reflects the increasing importance of digital resilience, which sits beyond the scope of most traditional governance codes. HSBC and Siemens publish detailed explanations of shareholder engagement, board evaluations, succession planning, and how board discussions shape strategy, clearly exceeding statutory requirements. Apple discloses director skills matrices, independence assessments, and governance guidelines that align with investor expectations rather than minimum legal standards. Across regions, many companies now integrate climate governance into their board reports, connecting risk management, sustainability goals, and board oversight of transition planning.

These examples highlight three ways companies go beyond both law and code. First, they expand the scope of governance to cover emerging risks like technology, AI oversight, and climate, signalling that boards are treating these as strategic responsibilities. Second, they increase transparency, using narrative disclosures to explain not only what governance structures exist but why they exist and how they support long-term value creation. Third, they incorporate investor stewardship into their governance systems, recognising that active investor dialogue is itself a governance mechanism.

Governance today is no longer about ticking boxes but about using oversight, transparency, and board capability to strengthen strategic execution. Codes define expectations, but companies that treat governance as a strategic muscle — rather than a compliance burden — ultimately deliver better performance, build trust, and adapt faster to emerging challenges. As global standards continue to evolve, the most successful boards will be those that adopt the hybrid model: combining a disciplined foundation of rules for financial integrity with a flexible, principle-driven approach to strategy, technology oversight, culture, and sustainability.

法規、收斂，以及董事會如何真正超越規則本身

企業管治已從一個學術小眾話題，發展成為塑造企業如何創造價值、管理風險與建立投資者信心的主流學科。每一套管治框架背後，都圍繞着三個重要問題：何種管治哲學最有效、各國的管治守則在實踐上有何差異，以及企業今日是否僅僅遵規守法，還是積極把企業管治視為競爭優勢的一部分。

觀察全球主要的企業管治守則，可以看到多元並存與逐步收斂的趨勢。英國的《企業管治守則》是最具代表性的原則導向制度，以「遵守或解釋」為核心，鼓勵深度披露、強化董事會效能、制度化評估流程，以及提升報酬透明度。德國企業管治守則則反映其特有的兩層董事會架構，結合法規與建議條文，強調監事會的監督角色，並規範管理層、股東與勞工之間的互動。日本的企業管治守則着重提升董事會獨立性、董事會效能與投資者對話，以回應其歷史上由內部人士主導及交叉持股的挑戰。新加坡的守則則結合原則與明確規範，並更加注重科技風險及市場公信力，反映其作為國際金融中心的定位。置於這些框架之上，G20／OECD 企業管治原則則充當全球共同語言，定義透明度、問責、股東公平待遇及利害關係人考量的基礎。

從這些守則可以看出，每個國家都有其制度與文化背景。差異反映不同的制度設計，例如單層與雙層董事會，以及市場結構，例如銀行主導或股權分散的市場形式。然而，所有守則都共享一個核心：獨立監督、透明報導、完善內部控制與風險管理，以及董事會效能的重視。這共同基礎正是全球企業管治逐步走向一致的清晰證據。

原則導向（principles-based）與規則導向（rules-based）之爭仍然是企業管治的重要議題。規則提供確定性、減少模糊空間，並便於監管，例如美國《薩班斯-奧克斯利法案》（SOX）中明確強制內部控制、審計委員會獨立性與專業要求。另一方面，原則導向容許企業依其策略與環境調整管治方式，重視結果而非形式，依賴透明度與市場紀律。英國與 OECD 的做法正反映了這種以價值創造為核心的模式。

實踐中，世界各地正逐漸走向混合模式。監管機構愈來愈傾向明確規定少數不可妥協的底線，例如財務報導、審計委員會獨立性與內部控制；其餘涉及董事會效能、利害關係人互動、永續管理及策略監督的部分，則交由原則和市場自律來驅動。像 Hermes 這類投資者監管機構，亦透過投票政策與對話施加壓力，形成比法規更強的非正式約束。因此，全球不太可能收斂至單一管治理論，反而會在「不可動搖的少量規則」之外，保留更廣泛且具彈性的原則生態系。

檢視多家大型跨國企業的企業管治報告，可以發現不少企業已遠遠超越法律與守則的最低要求。匯豐、Siemens、Toyota、星展銀行（DBS）與 Apple 都不將企業管治視為例行披露，而是當成企業策略的一部分。Toyota 與 DBS 清楚將管治理念連結至長期策略、永續承諾與科技風險監督，反映董事會對未來議題的前瞻性。DBS 尤其聚焦於科技與網絡風險，這類議題甚至尚未納入許多傳統管治守則。匯豐與 Siemens 則詳盡披露董事會評估、接班規劃、股東參與與策略討論方式，遠超法定需要。Apple 更呈現技能矩陣、獨立性審查與治理指南，完全以投資者期望為標準，而非僅滿足最低法定要求。同樣地，許多公司已將氣候管治納入董事會報告，將風險管理、永續目標與轉型監督連結起來。

這些案例突顯企業如何超越守則：首先，他們將新興風險（例如科技、AI、氣候）納入董事會核心職責，將治理從過去的合規框架提升至策略層次；其次，他們加強透明度，解釋治理架構「存在的原因」及「如何支持長期價值」；最後，他們將投資者監管力量系統化，承認投資者對話本身就是治理機制。

企業管治不再是打勾式的程序，而是一套強化策略執行、建立信任與加速應對風險的能力。守則提供基準，但真正成功的企業，是那些將管治視為「策略肌肉」而非「合規負擔」的公司。隨着全球標準不斷演進，最卓越的董事會將是那些採取混合模式、在金融誠信上堅守規則，同時以原則靈活推動策略、科技監督、文化塑造與永續發展的企業。

Transparency, Governance and What It Means for a New IPO

Transparency in governance is one of the most defining signals of corporate maturity, especially for companies preparing to enter the public markets. As organisations approach an IPO, their ability to communicate clearly about risk management, internal controls, and board oversight often shapes investor confidence as much as their commercial story. To understand what strong governance disclosure looks like in practice, it is helpful to examine companies recognised for excellence in this area. The FTSE 100 companies 3i, Aviva and BAE Systems were celebrated in the 2010 Transparency in Governance Awards for their disclosures on risk management and internal control. These organisations were distinguished not merely by reporting risks, but by explaining governance architecture with precision: board responsibilities, committee structures, internal audit mechanisms, risk identification, mitigation processes and links to strategic oversight. Their reports show discipline, clarity and an investor-minded approach to communication. When compared to another major listed company like BT Group, one sees clear differences. BT’s 2010 disclosures were comprehensive and compliant, with detailed risk sections, robust financial statements and committee reporting. However, the award-winning organisations demonstrated a deeper narrative about how risks are governed, how internal controls function continuously, and how oversight structures are embedded into culture and strategy. It is this narrative, rather than compliance alone, that gives investors confidence during an IPO.

The question of how governance should evolve in modern corporations leads naturally to the longstanding debate about worker or employee directors. This debate, discussed in depth in the UK Bullock Report of 1977, reflects a tension between board professionalisation and broader stakeholder participation. Proponents argue that employees, who experience operational realities and bear the consequences of corporate decisions, should have a direct voice at board level. They believe worker directors can strengthen trust, contribute unique frontline insights and help boards take a longer-term, more socially grounded view of corporate health. Opponents argue that directors must act in the interests of the company as a whole, and that worker directors may face divided loyalties between employee representation and legal fiduciary duties. They worry about introducing conflicts into the boardroom, weakening board cohesion and undermining confidentiality. They also highlight that rigid representation models, like those suggested in Bullock, may not reflect the complexity or diversity of modern corporate structures. Today, although stakeholder expectations have evolved, and employee engagement is a board-level priority in many jurisdictions, the formal appointment of worker directors remains rare in UK-listed companies. Instead, companies rely on alternative mechanisms such as employee councils, workforce advisory panels, ESG oversight and disclosure, and share ownership schemes.

For a company preparing for flotation, however, the core governance challenge is not experimentation but credibility. The chairman and chief executive I am advising is right to think deeply about governance signalling. As the company transitions from private to public ownership, the market will judge governance readiness by the clarity of risk controls, transparency of financial oversight, strength of independent challenge and alignment with regulatory expectations. Investors will compare the company’s governance disclosures with benchmarks set by leaders like 3i, Aviva and BAE Systems. They will expect evidence of a functioning risk framework, active board committees, meaningful internal audit, well-articulated principal risks, ESG considerations and clear accountability lines. These expectations shape not only valuation but also whether institutional investors participate at all.

The question of whether one individual should serve as both chairman and CEO is central to governance credibility. Although there can be advantages to role combination, particularly in founder-led or high-growth contexts, most institutional investors favour separating the two roles. Concentrating decision-making authority in a single individual raises concerns about diminished oversight, weaker challenge and higher governance risk. An independent chairman provides a counterweight to executive power, acts as a steward of the board, and reinforces the integrity of governance processes. Even if you are confident in your ability to balance these responsibilities, the market perception may be unfavourable, affecting valuation and demand during the IPO. That said, if you choose to retain both titles, robust mitigations must be introduced, such as a majority-independent board, a senior independent director empowered to challenge the executive role, strong audit and risk committees, and full transparency in disclosures explaining the decision. These measures demonstrate good faith and signal that the company recognises investor concerns, even if it adopts a structure that deviates from best practice.

The broader lesson is that governance is not an abstract exercise. It materially affects access to capital, shareholder trust and long-term strategic flexibility. By mirroring the clarity of governance demonstrated by 3i, Aviva and BAE, by recognising the evolving expectations around stakeholder interests even if not adopting worker directors at this stage, and by addressing the chairman–CEO question with discipline and transparency, the company can position itself as a responsible, credible and well-prepared candidate for public markets. This is not merely good practice; it is a strategic advantage as the company enters its next chapter.

透明度、公司治理與新上市企業的意義

在全球資本市場中，企業治理正迅速成為衡量一家企業信任度與可持續性的核心指標。隨着監管環境日益複雜、利益相關者的期望不斷提高，以及社會對透明度的需求日益迫切，領先企業正透過加強風險管理、內部控制、董事會結構與員工參與等方面來重塑治理格局。

回顧 2010 年於「治理透明度獎項」中獲獎的三家富時100指數公司──3i、Aviva 與 BAE Systems──我們可以看到高度成熟的治理披露水準。這三家公司在年度報告中均展現了清晰的風險敘述框架、定期的內部控制審查流程、管理層與董事會之間的清楚職能分工，以及具前瞻性的風險文化聲明。他們不僅揭露風險項目，也說明風險如何被監督、如何影響策略，以及管理層如何負責，提供了完整的治理敘事。

若將這些報告與另一家上市公司比較，例如某些仍以最低法定要求為基準的企業，我們可看到明顯差異。一些公司依然以合規導向編寫風險段落，只提供模糊描述、缺乏量化資訊，或未能解釋董事會如何實際監督風險。相較之下，治理透明度獲獎企業已經將風險報告視為策略敘事的重要組成部分，而不是形式化的披露要求。這種「從合規到信任」的轉變，是企業治理走向成熟的象徵。

治理的另一重要話題，是員工董事制度。自 1977 年英國 Bullock 報告以來，是否應讓員工代表參與董事會治理的辯論從未停止。支持者認為，員工是企業最核心的利益相關者，他們的聲音能提升決策視角、改善勞資關係、強化企業長期主義。反對者則擔心角色衝突、保密義務問題、決策效率下降，或擔心員工董事可能被定位成象徵性存在。儘管如此，歐洲多國具體實踐已證明，若設計得當，員工董事可加強企業文化並促進更可持續的治理模式。這場辯論反映出一個更大的趨勢：企業價值正從僅為股東創造回報，走向兼顧更廣泛的利益相關者。

當企業正準備進行首次公開招股（IPO）時，治理結構的每一個細節都將成為投資者關注的焦點。若公司主席兼行政總裁反對分拆兩個職務，他需要明白市場、監管機構與投資者對角色分離的強烈期待。兩職分開能確保制衡、避免權力過度集中、提升董事會獨立性，並落實清晰問責。然而，若公司領導者希望維持兩職合一，也不是不可行──但需要更強的治理配套，包括更具權力的獨立董事、加強審核與提名委員會職能、透明的決策紀錄，以及強而有力的企業文化機制，以確保決策是基於策略需要，而非個人偏好。

企業治理的核心並非框架，而是信任。透明度、角色清晰、員工參與與董事會獨立性，都是企業與投資者之間建立信任的橋樑。當市場愈加複雜、科技變革加速、風險格局日益多變，真正具備前瞻性的企業，不會將治理視為限制，而會視為競爭優勢。在下一個十年裏，領先企業將是那些主動擁抱透明度、以治理提升策略韌性，並將企業視為一個需要平衡多方利益的負責任行動者。

企業治理不再只是制度，它是企業文化的一部分；不再只是披露文件，它是價值觀的體現。愈早理解這一點的企業，愈能在全球市場中建立可持續的領導地位。

Theories, Crises, and the Purpose of the Corporation

Corporate governance has evolved through decades of economic shifts, corporate failures, and intellectual debates about the purpose of the modern corporation. At its core, corporate governance concerns how companies are directed and controlled, and particularly how power is distributed and exercised among managers, owners, and stakeholders. The field draws on several theoretical perspectives, each illuminating different aspects of governance. Although these theories sometimes appear to conflict, they are better understood as complementary perspectives on the same fundamental challenge: ensuring that those who manage the corporation act in the best interests of the enterprise, its owners, and society.

Agency theory starts from the assumption that managers are self-interested agents and that shareholders, as principals, require mechanisms to ensure alignment. Monitoring, incentives, audits, and disclosure frameworks become essential tools to mitigate managerial opportunism. Stewardship theory challenges this view by suggesting that managers are intrinsically motivated professionals who aim to act as responsible stewards of corporate assets. This perspective emphasises trust, empowerment, and collaboration rather than control. Stakeholder theory expands the discussion further by asserting that the corporation has responsibilities not only to shareholders but to a broader set of stakeholders including employees, customers, suppliers, communities, regulators, and the environment. Governance, in this view, is about balancing diverse interests rather than maximising shareholder value alone.

Despite their differences, these theories are not mutually exclusive. In practice, modern governance frameworks blend monitoring and trust, performance and purpose, compliance and culture. Boards frequently adopt both agency-based mechanisms for oversight and stewardship-oriented approaches to leadership development, while also recognising that long-term shareholder value is inseparable from stakeholder well-being. These theories function as complementary lenses for understanding the complex realities of governance in contemporary corporations.

Major developments in corporate governance have typically emerged as responses to crises. The Cadbury Report followed high-profile corporate failures in the UK, the OECD Principles were shaped by the Asian financial crisis, and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was born directly from the collapses of Enron and WorldCom. Crisis exposes weaknesses in board oversight, risk management, audit practices, and organisational culture, prompting regulators and business leaders to formalise lessons learned into governance codes and best practices. This reactive model has strengths, as crises generate urgency and political will that enable reforms which may otherwise face resistance or inertia. They also provide real-world evidence of where governance systems have failed.

However, crisis-driven governance reform has drawbacks. It is inherently backward-looking, addressing the last failure rather than the next. It risks creating overly prescriptive, compliance-heavy frameworks that encourage box-ticking rather than thoughtful engagement with governance principles. Reliance on conventional wisdom may overlook insights from behavioural science, complexity theory, or systemic risk analysis. True governance effectiveness requires a proactive approach that integrates empirical research, anticipatory risk assessment, and cultural transformation rather than merely codifying historical lessons.

The question of who corporations ultimately exist to serve remains central in governance debates. Roberto Goizuetta, former CEO of Coca-Cola, argued that the primary calling of a company is to create value for its owners and warned that companies lose their way when they try to be all things to all people. There is validity in his concern. Shareholders are residual claimants who bear the greatest financial risk, and a clear focus on value creation prevents managerial drift and mission dilution. Many corporate failures have been attributed to a lack of strategic clarity or an overextension into unrelated objectives.

Yet modern governance acknowledges that shareholder value cannot be divorced from the interests of employees, customers, communities, and the environment. Long-term value creation requires sustainable supply chains, engaged workforces, regulatory trust, technological resilience, and environmental responsibility. Excessive short-termism in the name of shareholder primacy has historically contributed to poor corporate behaviour and systemic financial instability. Companies that consider stakeholder interests are not necessarily attempting to “serve many masters” but rather to build the conditions for durable value creation.

The most balanced view recognises that while the corporation must remain disciplined in its fundamental mission to create value, this mission is best achieved through responsible engagement with its broader stakeholder network. Corporate governance today is therefore an exercise in integration: aligning performance with purpose, profit with sustainability, and accountability with societal expectations. The strongest companies are those that create value for shareholders by creating value for the ecosystem around them.

Reflecting on the full scope of corporate governance, it becomes evident that while the traditional framework covers many critical elements, it can be expanded. Modern governance should integrate behavioural science, sustainability metrics, AI ethics, organisational psychology, stakeholder co-creation, and digital governance. These areas increasingly influence both risk and long-term value creation. A more holistic governance model would help organisations respond to emerging challenges such as climate change, cyber threats, workforce transformation, and societal expectations regarding fairness, purpose, and responsibility.

Corporate governance remains a living discipline. As organisations evolve, so must the frameworks that guide their integrity and accountability. Governance is not only about rules and oversight—it is about shaping responsible organisations that can thrive, innovate, and contribute positively to society.

理論、危機與企業存在的目的

企業管治在過去數十年間隨着經濟轉變、企業倒閉，以及對現代公司目的的辯論而不斷演進。從本質上看，企業管治關注企業如何被指導與監督，特別是管理層、股東與其他持份者之間權力如何分配與運用。此領域建立在不同理論的基礎上，各自突顯管治的不同維度。這些理論有時看似互相矛盾，但實際上更像是針對同一核心問題的多重視角：如何確保企業的管理者能以企業、所有者及社會的最大利益行事。

代理理論假設管理者是自利的代理人，而股東作為委託人需要機制來確保雙方目標一致。因此，監察、獎勵制度、審計以及披露等制度成為防止管理者機會主義行為的重要工具。管家理論則挑戰這種假設，指出管理者往往受專業精神、責任感與內在動機驅動，更傾向成為資源的負責管家而非自利的代理人。此觀點強調的是信任、授權與合作，而非控制。持份者理論的視野更為廣闊，主張企業不僅要對股東負責，更應顧及所有受企業行為影響的人，包括員工、社區、客戶、供應商、監管者與環境。此時的管治不再只是最大化股東利益，而是平衡不同群體的期望與需求。

儘管這些理論側重不同，但並非互相排斥。實踐中，現代企業管治同時吸納監督與信任、績效與使命、合規與文化等元素。董事會往往兼具代理理論下的監督角色，以及管家理論倡導的支持性領導方式，同時也理解到長期股東價值無法與持份者福祉分割。這些理論共同為理解今日公司治理的複雜現實提供了多角度的分析框架。

企業管治的重要發展往往源於危機。英國的 Cadbury 報告因企業醜聞而生，OECD 原則在亞洲金融風暴後制定，美國《沙賓法案》則直接回應安然與世通倒閉等重大事件。危機暴露了董事會監督、風險管理、審計實務及企業文化的弱點，迫使監管者與企業領袖將經驗轉化為形式化的管治原則與指引。這種反應式模式確有其優點，因為危機能促使改革，令原本可能停滯不前的制度得以突破，並提供現實案例揭露制度漏洞。

然而，基於危機的改革亦具有侷限。它往往着眼於過去問題，而非未來風險；有時會導致過度規管，使管治變成形式主義與打勾行為，而非真正反思。倚賴商界「慣常智慧」亦可能忽略行為科學、系統風險、複雜性等前沿視角。要真正提升企業管治，必須結合實證研究、前瞻性風險評估與文化變革，而非單純把過往教訓寫進守則。

企業最終應服務誰，一直是管治辯論的核心議題。可口可樂前 CEO Roberto Goizuetta 曾表示，企業的首要使命是為股東創造價值，而公司往往在「嘗試取悅所有人」時迷失方向。他的觀點確有其價值。股東承擔最高財務風險，因此是企業最終的財務承擔者；而明確的單一目標有助企業維持紀律與焦點，避免策略飄移。許多企業失敗皆源於缺乏明確方向或過度延伸至無謂的目標。

然而，現代企業管治亦認為，真正持久的股東價值不能與員工、客戶、社會與環境的利益分離。長期價值建立在永續供應鏈、投入的員工、監管信任、科技韌性與環境責任之上。過度短期化的股東至上觀念曾導致不良行為與金融系統不穩定。重視持份者利益的公司不是試圖「服務多個主人」，而是在為企業長期價值奠定基礎。

最平衡的觀點是：企業必須堅守創造價值的核心使命，但這一使命最終透過負責任地對待更廣泛的持份者網絡來實現。企業管治因此是一種整合：將績效與使命結合，將利潤與永續結合，將責任與社會期望結合。最具韌性的企業，是那些透過為整個生態圈創造價值，進而為股東創造價值的企業。

Reflecting on the full scope of corporate governance, it becomes evident that while the traditional framework covers many critical elements, it can be expanded. Modern governance should integrate behavioural science, sustainability metrics, AI ethics, organisational psychology, stakeholder co-creation, and digital governance. These areas increasingly influence both risk and long-term value creation. A more holistic governance model would help organisations respond to emerging challenges such as climate change, cyber threats, workforce transformation, and societal expectations regarding fairness, purpose, and responsibility.

Corporate governance remains a living discipline. As organisations evolve, so must the frameworks that guide their integrity and accountability. Governance is not only about rules and oversight—it is about shaping responsible organisations that can thrive, innovate, and contribute positively to society.

Understanding Corporate Governance in a Changing World

Corporate governance has evolved into one of the most important disciplines in modern organisational life. At its core, governance defines how power is exercised, how decisions are made, and how organisations remain accountable to the stakeholders who rely on them. Although the language of corporate governance became common only in the 1980s, the underlying principles have existed for centuries. They reflect humanity’s ongoing attempt to balance authority, responsibility, fairness, and transparency within institutions that grow more complex as economies expand.

A corporate entity requires a constitution because clarity is essential when multiple parties share ownership and control. A constitution, or Articles of Association, sets out the rules of internal management, defining how directors are appointed, how decisions are made, how ownership rights are exercised, and how disputes are resolved. It creates a stable governance framework that reduces ambiguity and protects both shareholders and the organisation itself.

Distinguishing between private and public companies is central to understanding governance obligations. A private company raises capital privately, operates under lighter regulation, and is prohibited from offering shares to the general public. A public company, by contrast, may sell shares on the open market and must therefore comply with more stringent transparency, reporting, and investor-protection rules. This fundamental difference shapes every aspect of their governance structures.

A common source of confusion is the distinction between governance and management. Governance sets direction and ensures accountability, while management executes strategy and operates the organisation day to day. Governance answers “what” and “why,” whereas management answers “how.” This division is vital because organisations require both long-term stewardship and short-term operational proficiency.

In unitary board systems, common in the United States and United Kingdom, a paradox naturally arises. The board must simultaneously oversee management while also providing support to that same team. It is both mentor and monitor, collaborator and critic. Balancing these roles is a defining challenge of effective governance.

The scope of corporate governance is broad. It encompasses board structure, shareholder rights, executive accountability, risk management, ethical culture, disclosure, compliance, and stakeholder engagement. Yet, as organisations evolve, so do expectations. Today, environmental sustainability, digital risk, cybersecurity, data ethics, and societal impact increasingly form part of governance responsibilities. Traditional governance frameworks focused heavily on financial and legal compliance, but a more holistic view is now essential. If anything, the scope should expand to include digital resilience, AI governance, corporate purpose, psychological safety, and the broader effects of corporate behaviour on society.

Transparency is a core governance principle. In the United Kingdom, company accounts, annual returns, and statutory filings can be accessed by anyone through Companies House. This openness builds trust and ensures accountability, especially for publicly listed firms.

The United States has its own unique governance history. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was created in 1934 following the 1929 stock market crash and the collapse of investor confidence during the Great Depression. Its mission remains to protect investors, maintain fair and efficient markets, and ensure honest and transparent securities trading. Today’s regulatory ecosystem emerged directly from the failures of that era.

Board structures vary widely across countries. Some companies, especially start-ups or subsidiaries, operate with all-executive boards because they are small, privately owned, or guided by a parent company that provides governance oversight. US-listed companies typically adopt a single-tier board composed of both executives and independent directors, supported by audit, compensation, and governance committees.

Europe provides a notable contrast through the two-tier board system found in Germany. Here, a supervisory board represents shareholders and employees, overseeing but remaining separate from the management board that runs daily operations. This structural separation reinforces independence and stakeholder representation.

The European Union has gone a step further by creating legislation that allows the formation of a cross-border corporate entity known as a “European Company” or Societas Europaea (SE). This structure enables a company to operate across member states under a unified legal framework, reducing administrative complexity. Whether the United States should adopt a similar federal-level incorporation system is an interesting question. Currently, corporations are formed at the state level, with Delaware being the most common. A federal incorporation regime could provide uniform standards, simplify interstate operations, reduce legal fragmentation, and potentially strengthen corporate accountability. However, it might also diminish states’ ability to innovate and compete, which is part of what makes US corporate law adaptable and dynamic. The benefits would need to be weighed carefully against the loss of regulatory diversity.

Visualising governance structures can deepen understanding. A simple circle-and-triangle schematic can illustrate the layers of authority. Consider a professional sports club: the triangle represents governance at the top (the board), management in the middle (executives and coaches), and membership or supporters forming the base. The circle represents the broader ecosystem—regulators, league authorities, sponsors, and the community—who influence or constrain organisational behaviour. This diagram reveals how power flows: the board sets direction, management executes, and the wider environment shapes the organisation through rules, expectations, and resources. It becomes clear that power is not held solely within the organisation; it is constantly negotiated with external forces.

Reflecting on the full scope of corporate governance, it becomes evident that while the traditional framework covers many critical elements, it can be expanded. Modern governance should integrate behavioural science, sustainability metrics, AI ethics, organisational psychology, stakeholder co-creation, and digital governance. These areas increasingly influence both risk and long-term value creation. A more holistic governance model would help organisations respond to emerging challenges such as climate change, cyber threats, workforce transformation, and societal expectations regarding fairness, purpose, and responsibility.

Corporate governance remains a living discipline. As organisations evolve, so must the frameworks that guide their integrity and accountability. Governance is not only about rules and oversight—it is about shaping responsible organisations that can thrive, innovate, and contribute positively to society.

在變動世界中理解公司治理

公司治理已成為現代組織生活中最重要的學科之一。其核心在於界定權力如何被行使、決策如何產生，以及組織如何對依賴它們的利害關係人負責。雖然「公司治理」這個詞直到 1980 年代才普及，但其底層原則已存在數百年，反映了人類在企業規模與經濟複雜度不斷增加的情況下，持續嘗試在權力、責任、公平與透明之間取得平衡。

一間企業需要一份章程，是因為當多方共享所有權與控制權時，清晰性變得十分重要。章程（或公司組織章程大綱與細則）訂定公司內部治理的規則，界定董事如何任命、決策如何進行、股東如何行使權利，以及爭議如何解決。它建立一套穩定的治理框架，減少模糊與衝突，保障股東與公司自身的長期運作。

區分私人公司與上市公司是理解治理義務的基礎。私人公司以非公開方式集資，監管較少，也不能向公眾出售股份。上市公司則可在公開市場籌集資金，因此必須遵守更嚴格的透明度、申報及投資者保護規範。這一根本差異形塑兩類公司的治理模式。

治理與管理的差別常常引起混淆。治理負責設定方向與確保問責，管理則執行策略並處理日常營運。治理回答「做什麼」與「為什麼」，管理回答「如何做」。兩者的區隔至關重要，因為組織需要長期的監督與短期的營運能力同時並存。

在美國與英國常見的單一董事會（unitary board）模式下，董事會的角色本身具有矛盾性：它既要監督管理層，同時又要支持管理層，是合作夥伴也是監督者。在同一個董事會內取得這種平衡，是有效治理的核心挑戰之一。

公司治理的範圍非常廣泛，包括董事會架構、股東權利、管理階層問責、風險管理、企業文化、資訊揭露、合規與利害關係人溝通。然而，隨著組織演變，治理的期待也在改變。今日，環境永續、數位風險、網路安全、資料倫理與社會責任已成為治理的重要組成部分。傳統治理框架主要聚焦財務與法律遵循，但現代企業需要更全面的治理視角。如果要改進，治理範圍應融合數位韌性、人工智慧治理、企業使命、心理安全及企業行為對社會的影響。

透明度是治理的核心原則之一。在英國，公司帳目、年度申報與其他法定文件可透過 Companies House 向公眾公開查閱，這種制度提升了信任與問責。

美國的治理歷史則帶有獨特背景。1934 年，美國證券交易委員會（SEC）在 1929 年股災及大蕭條後成立，目的是恢復投資者信心，並遏止詐欺與市場操縱行為。其使命至今仍然是保護投資者、維持公平有效的市場，以及確保交易的透明與誠實。今日的監管架構正是源自那段金融動盪時期的教訓。

各國的董事會架構有所不同。一些初創企業或集團子公司可能採用全主管（all-executive）董事會，因為它們規模較小、所有權集中特定人士，或由母公司提供治理監督。美國上市公司通常採用單一董事會，由管理層與獨立董事組成，並設有審計、薪酬及提名／治理委員會，以確保監督機制獨立運作。

歐洲則以德國的雙層董事會（two-tier board）制度為代表。其架構由監事會（Aufsichtsrat）與管理董事會（Vorstand）組成。監事會負責監督與任命管理董事會，且必須包含員工代表，確保利害關係人參與治理；管理董事會則負責企業的日常營運。兩者明確分離，強調監督獨立性。

歐盟更進一步創立跨國法律架構，允許成立跨境「歐洲公司」（Societas Europaea, SE），讓企業可在會員國間以統一的法律制度運作，降低行政成本。若美國仿效採用聯邦層級的公司註冊制度會如何，是值得探討的議題。目前美國公司是在州層級註冊（尤其是 Delaware 最受歡迎）。聯邦制度可能提供統一標準、簡化跨州營運、減少法律碎片化並提升治理品質，但也可能犧牲州與州之間的法規創新與競爭。這將是一場在效率與靈活性之間的權衡。

在視覺化治理結構時，使用圓形與三角形的示意圖能幫助理解權力流動。以一個專業體育俱樂部為例：三角形頂端代表治理（董事會），中間層代表管理（教練、行政領導），底部是會員或支持者。外圍的圓形則代表規管機構、聯盟、贊助商與社區等外部力量。透過這種視覺化模型，我們可以看到權力不僅在組織內部流動，同時也受到外部力量的牽引。組織並非孤立運作，而是在更大的生態圈中持續互動。

回顧公司治理的整體範圍，可以看出傳統框架雖涵蓋許多核心領域，但仍可擴展。現代治理應納入行為科學、永續績效、AI 倫理、組織心理學、利害關係人共創，以及數位治理等新範疇。這些議題已直接影響企業風險、績效與長期價值。更全面的治理模型能讓組織更好地應對氣候變化、網路威脅、數位轉型、工作型態演變，以及社會對企業使命與公平性的期待。

公司治理是一門不斷演化的學科。隨著組織變動，管理它們的框架也必須同步成長。治理不只是規則與監督，更關乎塑造負責任、有韌性、能創新、並能為社會帶來正面貢獻的企業。

Why corporate governance was slow to evolve

Corporate governance is a familiar phrase today, but its rise was surprisingly slow. Although the underlying ideas were understood as early as 1932, when Berle and Means described the separation of ownership and control, the term “corporate governance” itself did not take hold until the 1980s. For much of the twentieth century, management studies focused primarily on how to run companies, strategy, operations, marketing, and leadership, rather than on how power should be overseen or balanced inside firms. Oversight, fiduciary duty, and board accountability were seen as legal or political matters, not management challenges. Academic and professional priorities therefore concentrated on efficiency and growth rather than control, accountability, or the protection of stakeholder interests. This meant that although the concepts existed, the institutional structures and political will required to turn these ideas into a distinct field were missing until major scandals forced attention.

Another reason for the slow evolution was the fragmentation of legal and financial systems. Corporate law, accounting standards, securities regulation, and banking rules all evolved at different speeds and often with conflicting objectives. Governance problems that cut across these systems, such as off–balance sheet financing or related-party transactions, were difficult to address because coordinated reform was rare. In many countries, concentrated ownership, family businesses, large industrial groups, or bank-controlled companies, reduced pressure for formal governance frameworks since dominant owners could directly discipline managers. Where ownership was dispersed, small shareholders were often apathetic. Without strong investor activism or institutional investors pushing for reform, governance did not gain traction. Most importantly, there had been no wave of spectacular corporate scandals large enough to politicize governance failures. Only in the 1980s, when major collapses and market abuses emerged across the world, did the term “corporate governance” become mainstream, as academics, regulators, and journalists sought ways to understand and prevent such failures.

Many early failures illustrate why governance eventually became a central concern. In Australia, the collapses associated with Alan Bond, the Bell Group, Laurie Connell, and Rothwells revealed the dangers of concentrated executive power, extreme leverage, opaque financing structures, and overly close relationships between business and politics. The lack of independent oversight allowed charismatic leaders to expand recklessly until reality caught up and creditors were left exposed. In the United Kingdom, the Robert Maxwell scandal demonstrated how a powerful executive could override weak internal controls to divert pension assets for personal use. This collapse showed the need for independent audit committees, pension oversight, and checks on the influence of dominant CEOs. In the United States, the insider-trading scandals involving Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken, and Drexel Burnham Lambert exposed cultures built on excessive risk-taking, misaligned incentives, and poor compliance. Although regulations existed, firms lacked the internal governance strength needed to prevent misconduct. In Japan, the Recruit scandal revealed deep entanglements between corporations and political elites. Pre-IPO allocations of shares were used to buy favour, exposing the weaknesses of disclosure rules and the risks of political capture.

Would modern governance codes have prevented these collapses? They would certainly have reduced the likelihood. Requirements for board independence, audit committees, disclosure of related-party transactions, stronger insider-trading enforcement, and clearer fiduciary duties all address the failure mechanisms seen in these early scandals. However, governance codes only work when supported by enforcement, independent institutions, competent auditors, and investors who hold leaders to account. Without these, even the best regulatory frameworks can be circumvented.

Later failures in the 1990s and 2000s provide even clearer evidence of recurring governance weaknesses. Enron collapsed when executives hid debt in off-balance sheet entities, and auditors at Arthur Andersen failed to provide independent scrutiny. WorldCom inflated earnings by capitalizing routine expenses, a practice driven by pressure from senior management. Tyco’s leadership used corporate funds for personal benefits in a culture with weak board oversight. Parmalat fabricated assets and hid debt through opaque financial structures, while HIH Insurance in Australia engaged in under-reserving, risky acquisitions, and chronic mismanagement until insolvency became unavoidable. Marconi and other British firms failed after overoptimistic forecasts, weak audit quality, and aggressive accounting undermined credibility. Across these cases, the common thread is unmistakable: the failure of checks and balances. Misaligned incentives encouraged short-term manipulation, boards lacked independence or expertise, auditors became too close to management, and complex, opaque financial structures made it difficult for any outsider to detect wrongdoing.

The financial institutions that collapsed during the 2007,2009 global financial crisis demonstrated that governance failures were not limited to individual companies but could undermine entire financial systems. Institutions such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual, and AIG suffered from excessive leverage, maturity mismatches, and a reliance on complex mortgage-backed securities that few board members truly understood. Compensation structures rewarded short-term volume rather than long-term risk management. Risk functions were often weak or subordinated to business units, and boards lacked the financial expertise needed to challenge executives. Regulators, fragmented across jurisdictions and constrained by outdated rules, failed to rein in systemic risk. The crisis revealed governance breakdowns at firm level, regulatory level, and system level.

The post-crisis reforms, stronger capital requirements, liquidity rules, independent risk committees, enhanced disclosure obligations, stress testing, and improved compensation design, were attempts to address these systemic failures. Yet they reaffirm a simple truth: governance is effective only when culture, incentives, oversight, and regulation align. When any one of these pillars fails, even sophisticated markets and powerful institutions can collapse.

The history of corporate governance can therefore be understood as a long-delayed response to recurring patterns of failure. The ideas were always known, but it took decades of scandals, collapses, and financial crises to force institutions to translate those ideas into practice. Corporate governance will continue to evolve because the underlying pressures, complex markets, powerful executives, aggressive incentives, and regulatory gaps, are permanent features of modern capitalism. The challenge is not simply creating stronger rules but fostering cultures and institutions capable of enforcing them.

為何公司治理的演進如此緩慢

今日「公司治理」已是耳熟能詳的詞彙，但它的興起其實相當緩慢。早在 1932 年，Berle 和 Means 已經指出所有權與控制權分離的問題，但「公司治理」這個用語直到 1980 年代才真正流行。二十世紀的大部分時間裡，管理學主要關注如何經營企業、策略、營運、行銷與領導，而非企業內部權力如何被監督或平衡。監督、信託責任、董事會問責等概念被視為法律或政治領域的議題，而不是管理問題。因此，學界與專業界都把焦點放在效率與成長，而不是控制、問責或保障利害關係人。這使得概念雖然存在，但缺乏將其制度化的動力，直到重大醜聞發生才促使外界重視。

另一個演變緩慢的原因，是法律與金融制度的碎片化。公司法、會計準則、證券法規與銀行監管皆以不同速度、不同邏輯演進，甚至互相矛盾。治理問題往往跨越這些制度，使得像表外融資、關係人交易等問題難以全面處理。在許多國家中，由於所有權高度集中，例如家族企業、企業集團或銀行主導企業，強力所有者本身就能制衡管理層，因此對正式治理機制的需求較低。而在所有權分散的市場中，小股東普遍冷漠，缺乏施壓力量。更重要的是，當時並沒有足夠嚴重的大型企業醜聞，使治理問題政治化。直到 1980 年代，各國接連爆出重大企業倒閉與市場濫權事件，學者、監管者與媒體才開始使用「公司治理」一詞，並尋求解釋與改革途徑。

早期企業崩潰的案例也清楚展現治理的重要性。在澳洲，Alan Bond、Bell Group、Laurie Connell 與 Rothwells 的倒閉，揭露了高層權力過度集中、極端槓桿、資訊不透明，以及商界與政治界關係過於緊密的風險。缺乏獨立監督，使得具有個人魅力的領導者得以不受制衡地擴張，直到資金鏈斷裂、債權人遭殃。在英國，Robert Maxwell 的醜聞顯示，一名強勢的 CEO 如何在內控薄弱的情況下挪用退休金資產，引發廣泛震驚。此事件凸顯獨立審計委員會、退休金監督與對 CEO 權力進行制衡的必要性。在美國，Ivan Boesky、Michael Milken 與 Drexel Burnham Lambert 的內幕交易醜聞則揭示了過度冒險、錯誤誘因與薄弱合規文化的問題。儘管法規已存在，企業內部治理仍不足以防止不當行為。在日本，Recruit 醜聞揭露企業與政治之間的深度糾結，透過上市前配股收買政治人物，使資訊揭露與政治干預的問題暴露無遺。

若以今日的治理守則能否避免這些事件來看，答案是：機率大幅降低。現代治理要求董事會獨立性、審計委員會、關係人交易揭露、強化內幕交易執法與明確的信託義務，都直接針對上述失敗機制。然而，治理要發揮效果，必須有執法機構、獨立制度、專業審計與積極股東共同支持。若缺乏這些條件，再良好的規範也可能被規避。

1990 與 2000 年代的崩潰案例更深入揭示治理弱點的重複性。Enron 倒閉源於高層利用表外實體隱藏債務，而會計師事務所 Arthur Andersen 未能提供獨立審查。WorldCom 透過將一般費用資本化以誇大獲利，動機來自高層的不當壓力。Tyco 的管理層則在幾乎沒有董事會監督的文化下，將公司資金用於個人奢侈開銷。義大利 Parmalat 偽造資產、隱藏債務，澳洲 HIH Insurance 則因低估準備金、高風險併購與長期管理不善而破產。英國的 Marconi 等公司則因過度樂觀預測、薄弱審計品質與激進會計手法而失去信任。這些事件的共同核心清晰可見：制衡失效。誘因錯置鼓勵短期操控、董事會缺乏獨立性或專業、審計師與管理層過度親密、複雜且不透明的財務結構使外界難以察覺問題。

2007 至 2009 年的全球金融危機則展示了治理失效不只毀掉企業，更能破壞整個金融體系。雷曼兄弟、貝爾斯登、華盛頓互惠與 AIG 等機構擁有極高槓桿、期限錯配，並過度依賴董事會難以理解的複雜金融商品。薪酬制度獎勵短期交易量，而非長期穩健風險管理。風險管理部門地位薄弱，甚至服從於業務單位，董事會缺乏挑戰管理層的金融專業知識。跨國監管機構分散且法規落後，使系統性風險不斷累積。這場危機揭露了企業、監管與體系三個層面的治理崩潰。

危機後的改革，包括更高的資本要求、流動性規範、獨立風險委員會、強化資訊揭露、壓力測試與更合理的薪酬制度，都是對治理失效的回應。然而，它再次凸顯一個簡單而重要的事實：治理只有在文化、誘因、監督與監管一致時，才能真正有效。只要其中一個環節失靈，即使是強大的市場與大型金融機構也可能倒下。

因此，公司治理的歷史其實是一段被延遲了數十年的學習過程。基礎理念一直都存在，但必須經歷無數次醜聞、倒閉與金融危機，制度才真正開始成形。公司治理將持續演進，因為市場複雜性、管理階層權力、激進誘因與監管缺口等問題，是現代資本主義的常態。真正的挑戰並非制定更多規則，而是培育能讓規則落實的文化與制度。